In 1997, Uganda launched the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) to transform the country into a modern economy. PEAP envisages the creation of an enabling environment for rapid and sustainable economic growth and aims to reduce the population living in absolute poverty, from 44% (1997) to below 10% by 2017. It places stronger emphasis on agricultural transformation, owing to the importance of the agricultural sector to the economy.
To enable farmers shift from predominantly subsistence farming, to producing for the market, government developed the Plan for Modernizing Agriculture (PMA) in 1998. PMA has several components, one of which is National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) which was launched in 2001 to facilitate the envisaged agricultural commercialization by supporting farmers to access agricultural information, knowledge and technology.
Despite these magnificent strategies, recent studies indicate that majority of the country’s population are becoming poorer. The National Household Survey showed a significant increase in the poor from 34% (7.2 million people) in 1999/2000 to 38% (8.9 million people) in 2002/2003.
NAADS has been heavily criticised and blamed for the persistent rural poverty. On his recent Bona Bagagawale (prosperity for all) tour of Luwero, president Museveni slapped a ban on NAADS funding and ordered a review into why it has failed to catalyse agricultural commercialisation.
Is it fair for government to blame NAADS for lack of progress on agricultural commercialisation? Have we critically analysed the basic ingredients for commercialisation, and are we satisfied that all is in place? Isn’t it possible that NAADS is only a scapegoat; that agricultural commercialisation is in fact an illusion that might never occur?
NAADS has definitely done the best it could have done – under the circumstances. It has mobilised farmers; empowered them through their farmers’ fora and procurement committees to articulate their farming constrains and procure advisory services to address those needs. In addition, it has championed the introduction and multiplication of new agricultural technologies such as temperate fruits (apples and grapes) in Kigezi and Rwenzori highlands.
Commercialising agriculture in most parts of Uganda, especially the heavily settled areas, faces a serious hitch over which NAADS has little control though. Consider the case of poor household access to arable land. In Kabale for instance, recent estimates show population density as nearly 300 persons per square kilometre of total land (including forests and other non-arable land cover forms). This increases to nearly 800 people per square kilometre of arable land. High density, coupled with the traditional land inheritance method has fragmented land into meagre plots. Total land holding in Kabale is estimated to be 0.25 – 1.0ha for a six-member household. Who does not agree that such an acute land scarcity would fatally short-circuit NAADS? How much commercialisation will a 6-member household owning fragmented, less than 0.3 ha plots achieve?
For such land-constrained communities, the key to Bona Bagagawale will certainly not be farming! Government should be aware that whatever its intentions, any agricultural spending on such people will not significantly transform their mode of production – which will at best – remain subsistence.
An opportunity which government can, and should pursue for such communities, is to promote Non-Farm Enterprises (NFEs). A landmark study, which DFID recently conducted in Uganda, revealed that NFEs contributed a bigger proportion of household income compared to farming. It also revealed that poverty was reducing fastest amongst women with a high level of NFEs within their livelihood strategies.
Uganda therefore needs to undertake policy reforms aimed at catalysing growth of the NFE sector. However, given the interdependence of NFE with other sectors (agriculture, natural resources, tourism, etc), what may actually be required is to fine-tune existing policies to improve linkages between NFE and other livelihood sectors.
It is important that we identify real issues behind commercialisation failures and proactively put Bona Bagagawale into context. Unfairly blaming NAADS is tantamount to wrong diagnosis. There are definitely areas where NAADS needs to improve to increase its impact and visibility.
NAADS is an evolving programme, which already constantly adjusts its methodological approaches based on regular reviews and critical reflection. A review which the president has ordered will therefore not only be utterly redundant but will miss the point!
Denis Mutabazi
September 2007
27 September 2007
19 September 2007
Will East African Federation Succumb to Trivialities?
In 1993, presidents Museveni, Moi and Mkapa agreed to revive the East African Cooperation that had collapsed in 1977. A treaty signed by the same presidents in November 1999 set out principles for economic, monetary, and political union. It provided for a common action on the movement of people and goods between member countries, establishment of a common customs union, elimination of international tariffs, establishment of an East African Legislative Assembly and a common president. This was formalised in a ceremony held in Arusha, in 2001. In December 2006, Rwanda and Burudi formally joined to EAC to make five, the number of countries constituting the federation.
The conditions for economic integration and prosperity cannot be more opportune! The EAC covers an area of over 1.8 million square kilometres with a combined population of almost 100 million. It has a vast economic and trade potential; as well as a common history, language (Kiswahili), culture and infrastructure.
Despite these prospects, we do not seem to have adequate safeguards against a possible collapse such as one we witnessed in 1977. There are ingredients that could undermine the spirit of EAC and possibly kill it off. Compared with factors that annihilated the EAC in 1997, these ingredients are trivial. In 1977, East Africa had become ideologically split, with Kenya advocating capitalist interventions, while Tanzania pursued socialism. Mistrust among the East African leaders mounted after president Amin had grabbed power by force and continuously castigated Tanzania for harbouring and supporting Ugandan rebels. Today, the elements that threaten EAC are of a much lower echelon. Let me elaborate a few of them.
Uganda has ample land conflicts. Some tribal and ethnic groupings have prevented other groupings from lawfully acquiring land and settling in “their” areas. The most vivid example is the Bakiga whom Banyoro have fought for decades with machetes, witchcraft, bullets and legislation. Baganda have dropped hints on several occasions that Buganda is for Baganda. Indeed the 1967 Kabaka crisis is said to have been triggered by an ultimatum Kabaka Mutesa gave President Obote, demanding that he immediately moves the capital of Uganda from Buganda’s soil. How will Ugandans allow Kenyans, Tanzanians, Rwandese, Barundi to freely move in, acquire land and settle, if they cannot allow their fellow citizens?
Nepotism in employments and business is a thorny issue in many institutions. Uganda Revenue Authority is reportedly for southerners. Until 20 years ago, you would not join the army if you were not from a northerner. The current army has often come under spotlight promoting southerners. Religious institutions are not clean either. A catholic bishop of Rwandese origin would never promote a priest into the “inner circle” of Kabale diocese if he was not a “umvandimwe;” a Rwandese word meaning “one who comes from the same womb.” This persisted until non “bavandimwe” priests violently revolted prompting the Pope to dethrone the bishop. If we don’t have displine to share employment opportunities based on merit, what will happen after we federate?
Differences in access to economic opportunities and social services have polarised Uganda into southern; perceived as the government’s “favourite” and northern; the “forgotten and neglected”. The last presidential elections gave prominence to this view when “one Uganda one people” was a campaign slogan for one presidential candidate. The candidate’s pledge to heal the divide uneventfully ended with his dramatic election defeat. Would a polarised Uganda meaningfully federate?
While president Museveni pursued regional integration, he simultaneously “disintegrated” his own country. Uganda had less than 30 districts in 1993. As the EAC initiative gained momentum, so was the disintegration of Uganda. To date, Uganda has over 80 districts. President Museveni’s federation argument has been numbers: a block with 100 million people is economically stronger than a single country with 28 million people. If we pursue the same argument, we would conclude that dismantled districts like Mbarara, Mpigi and others would never be the same. If president Museveni is willing to dismantle his own country, is his enthusiasm for East African federation genuine?
The elements that blew up the EAC in 1977 were quite visible – yet member governments stood by watching as the union collapsed. Will government this time heed issues that could easily pass for trivial?
Published in New Vision, September 24, 2007: https://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/21/588423
September 2007
The conditions for economic integration and prosperity cannot be more opportune! The EAC covers an area of over 1.8 million square kilometres with a combined population of almost 100 million. It has a vast economic and trade potential; as well as a common history, language (Kiswahili), culture and infrastructure.
Despite these prospects, we do not seem to have adequate safeguards against a possible collapse such as one we witnessed in 1977. There are ingredients that could undermine the spirit of EAC and possibly kill it off. Compared with factors that annihilated the EAC in 1997, these ingredients are trivial. In 1977, East Africa had become ideologically split, with Kenya advocating capitalist interventions, while Tanzania pursued socialism. Mistrust among the East African leaders mounted after president Amin had grabbed power by force and continuously castigated Tanzania for harbouring and supporting Ugandan rebels. Today, the elements that threaten EAC are of a much lower echelon. Let me elaborate a few of them.
Uganda has ample land conflicts. Some tribal and ethnic groupings have prevented other groupings from lawfully acquiring land and settling in “their” areas. The most vivid example is the Bakiga whom Banyoro have fought for decades with machetes, witchcraft, bullets and legislation. Baganda have dropped hints on several occasions that Buganda is for Baganda. Indeed the 1967 Kabaka crisis is said to have been triggered by an ultimatum Kabaka Mutesa gave President Obote, demanding that he immediately moves the capital of Uganda from Buganda’s soil. How will Ugandans allow Kenyans, Tanzanians, Rwandese, Barundi to freely move in, acquire land and settle, if they cannot allow their fellow citizens?
Nepotism in employments and business is a thorny issue in many institutions. Uganda Revenue Authority is reportedly for southerners. Until 20 years ago, you would not join the army if you were not from a northerner. The current army has often come under spotlight promoting southerners. Religious institutions are not clean either. A catholic bishop of Rwandese origin would never promote a priest into the “inner circle” of Kabale diocese if he was not a “umvandimwe;” a Rwandese word meaning “one who comes from the same womb.” This persisted until non “bavandimwe” priests violently revolted prompting the Pope to dethrone the bishop. If we don’t have displine to share employment opportunities based on merit, what will happen after we federate?
Differences in access to economic opportunities and social services have polarised Uganda into southern; perceived as the government’s “favourite” and northern; the “forgotten and neglected”. The last presidential elections gave prominence to this view when “one Uganda one people” was a campaign slogan for one presidential candidate. The candidate’s pledge to heal the divide uneventfully ended with his dramatic election defeat. Would a polarised Uganda meaningfully federate?
While president Museveni pursued regional integration, he simultaneously “disintegrated” his own country. Uganda had less than 30 districts in 1993. As the EAC initiative gained momentum, so was the disintegration of Uganda. To date, Uganda has over 80 districts. President Museveni’s federation argument has been numbers: a block with 100 million people is economically stronger than a single country with 28 million people. If we pursue the same argument, we would conclude that dismantled districts like Mbarara, Mpigi and others would never be the same. If president Museveni is willing to dismantle his own country, is his enthusiasm for East African federation genuine?
The elements that blew up the EAC in 1977 were quite visible – yet member governments stood by watching as the union collapsed. Will government this time heed issues that could easily pass for trivial?
Published in New Vision, September 24, 2007: https://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/21/588423
September 2007